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We use rich historical data on military procurement spending across U.S. regions to estimate the effects
of government spending in a monetary union. Aggregate military build-ups and draw-downs have
differential effects across regions. We use this variation to estimate an "open economy relative multiplier''
of approximately 1.5. We develop a framework for interpreting this estimate and relating it to estimates
of the standard closed economy aggregate multiplier. The closed economy aggregate multiplier is
highly sensitive to how strongly aggregate monetary and tax policy "leans against the wind.'' In contrast,
our estimate "differences out'' these effects because different regions in the union share a common
monetary and tax policy. Our estimate provides evidence in favor of models in which demand shocks
can have large effects on output.
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The eect of government spending on output is often summarized by a multiplier|the percentage
increase in output that results when government spending is increased by 1% of GDP. There is
a wide range of views about this statistic in the literature. On the one hand, the recent Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)|perhaps the largest scal stimulus plan in U.S.
history|was motivated by a relatively high estimate of the multiplier of 1.6 (Romer and Bernstein,
2009). Other studies argue that the multiplier is substantially smaller and potentially close to zero.
In particular, if the determination of output is dominated by supply-side factors, an increase in
government purchases to a large extent \crowds out" private sector consumption and investment.
The wide range of views on the multiplier arises in part from the diculty of measuring it.
Changes in government spending are rarely exogenous, leading to a range of estimates depending
on the estimation approach.1 Two main approaches have been used to estimate the multiplier in
the academic literature. The rst is to study the output eects of increases in military spending
associated with wars, which are plausibly unrelated to prevailing macroeconomic conditions (Ramey
and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 1999; Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004;
Ramey, 2010; Barro and Redlick, 2011; Fisher and Peters, 2010). This approach faces the challenge
that large wars are relatively infrequent. Another challenge is confounding variation associated
with tax increases, price controls, patriotism, and other macroeconomic shocks.2 The second main
approach used to identify the multiplier is the structural VAR approach (Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; Perotti, 2007; Mountford and Uhlig, 2008; Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh, 2010). This approach
relies on structural assumptions about output and scal policy dynamics to estimate the multiplier.
The wide range of views on the multiplier also results from a lack of clear predictions in the the-
oretical literature. The government spending multiplier is not a deep structural parameter like the
elasticity of labor supply or the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Dierent models, therefore,
dier in their implications about the multiplier depending on what is assumed about preferences,
technology, government policy and various \frictions." Simple versions of the Neoclassical model
generally imply a small multiplier, typically smaller than 0.5 (see, e.g., Baxter and King, 1993). The
multiplier is sensitive to how the spending is nanced|smaller if it is nanced by distortionary taxes
1For surveys of the existing evidence, see for example Perotti (2007), Hall (2009), Alesina and Ardagna (2009) and
Cogan et al. (2010).
2Most of the evidence from this approach derives from the U.S. experience during WWII and the Korean War,
when changes in U.S. military spending were largest and most abrupt as a fraction of total output. Hall (2009) and
Barro and Redlick (2011) emphasize that it is not possible to draw meaningful inference using aggregate data on
military spending after 1955 because there is insucient variation in military spending in this period.
1than lump sum taxes.3 In New Keynesian models, the size of the multiplier depends critically on
the extent to which monetary policy \leans against the wind." Strongly counter-cyclical monetary
policy|such as that commonly estimated for the Volcker-Greenspan period|can generate quite
low multipliers|comparable to those for the Neoclassical model. However, when monetary policy
is less responsive|e.g., at the zero lower bound|the multiplier can exceed two.4 Clearly, there is
no \single" government spending multiplier. All estimates of the government spending multiplier
depend on the policy regime in place. This is likely one contributing factor for the wide range of
empirical estimates of the multiplier discussed above.
We analyze the eects of government spending in a monetary and scal union|the United
States. In this setting, we estimate the eect that an increase in government spending in one region
of the union relative to another has on relative output and employment. We refer to this as the
\open economy relative multiplier." Studying a monetary union has the unique advantage that
the relative monetary policy is precisely pinned down by the fact that the nominal interest rate
is common across dierent regions (and the exchange rate xed across regions). This implies that
increased spending in one region relative to another cannot lead to tighter monetary policy in that
region relative to the other. Also, federal spending is nanced by federal taxes levied in the same
way across regions. An increase in federal spending in one region relative another, therefore, does
not increase current or future tax rates in that region relative to other regions. We show that an
important advantage of the open economy relative multiplier that arises from being able to precisely
specify relative policy across regions, is that we can more easily distinguish between dierent models
of how government spending aects the economy.
We use regional variation in military spending to estimate the multiplier. Military spending is
notoriously political and thus likely to be endogenous to regional economic conditions (see, e.g.,
Mintz, 1992). We use an instrumental variables approach to identify an exogenous component of
regional variation in military spending. Our instruments are based on two characteristics of military
spending. First, national military spending is dominated by geopolitical events. Second, when
national military spending rises by 1 percentage point of GDP, it rises on average by more than
3 percentage points in states that receive a disproportionate amount of military spending|such
as California and Connecticut|but by less than one-half of one percent in states that don't|
3See, e.g., Baxter and King (1993), Ohanian (1997), Corsetti et al., 2009, and Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011).
4Intuitively, at the zero lower bound, monetary policy is rendered impotent and a scal expansion is particularly
eective since it lowers real interest rates by raising in
ation (Eggertsson, 2010; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
2011).
2such as Illinois. We use this heterogeneity in the response of regional spending to national military
build-ups and draw-downs to identify the eects of government spending on output. Our identifying
assumption is that the U.S. does not embark on military buildups|such as those associated with the
Vietnam war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan|because states that receive a disproportionate
amount of military spending are doing poorly relative to other states. This assumption is similar|
but weaker than|the common identifying assumption in the empirical literature on the eects of
national military spending, that variation in national military spending is exogenous to the U.S.
business cycle. By including time xed eects, we control for aggregate shocks and policy that
aect all states at a particular point in time|such as changes in distortionary taxes and aggregate
monetary policy.5
We estimate the \open economy relative multiplier" to be roughly 1.5. In other words, when
relative per-capita government purchases in a region rises by 1% of regional output, relative per-
capita output in that region rises by roughly 1.5%. This open economy relative multiplier diers
from the \closed economy aggregate multiplier" one might estimate using aggregate U.S. data.
We develop a theoretical framework to help us interpret our multiplier estimate and assess how it
relates to the closed economy aggregate multiplier for the United States. Our main conclusion is
that our estimate favors models in which demand shocks can have large eects on output. Our
estimate lines up well with the multiplier implied by an open economy New Keynesian model in
which consumption and labor are complements.6 The \plain-vanilla" Neoclassical model, however,
yields a substantially lower open economy relative multiplier.
We show that in the New Keynesian model, the open economy relative multiplier is larger than
the closed economy aggregate multiplier if monetary policy is of the type seen in the U.S. in recent
decades (under Volcker and Greenspan). The reason is that the relative monetary policy across
regions|xed relative nominal rate and exchange rate|is more accommodative than \normal"
monetary policy in the U.S.|which raises the real interest rate substantially in response to in
a-
tionary shocks such as government spending shocks. Our open economy relative multiplier is thus
akin to a closed economy aggregate multiplier for a more accommodative monetary policy than the
5Since regional variation in military procurement is much larger than aggregate variation, this approach allows us
to overturn the conclusion from the literature that focuses on aggregate data that little can be learned about scal
multipliers from the post-1960 data. Data from this period may be more informative about the size of the scal
multiplier for \normal times" and \normal purchases" than data from WWII and the Korean war. Several authors
suggest that the multiplier may be dierent for military versus non-military spending, but these ndings rely heavily
on the WWII and Korean War experiences when variation in military spending was associated with price controls,
rationing, patriotism and large changes in taxes (e.g., Perotti 2007; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2010).
6Another potential approach to matching our multiplier estimate would be to consider a model with \hand-to-
mouth" consumers as in Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007).
3one seen in the U.S. under Volcker and Greenspan. The New Keynesian model, therefore, implies
that our estimate of 1.5 for the open economy relative multiplier is perfectly consistent with much
lower existing estimates of the closed economy aggregate multiplier (e.g., those of Barro and Redlick,
2011).
Since the nominal interest rate is xed across regions in our setting, one might think that our
open economy relative multiplier would be akin to the closed economy aggregate multiplier when
nominal interest rates are xed at the zero lower bound, in which case the New Keynesian model
generates large multipliers (Eggertsson, 2010; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2011). We show
that this is not the case. This simple intuition ignores a crucial dynamic aspect of price responses
in a monetary union. Since transitory demand shocks do not lead to permanent changes in relative
prices across regions and the exchange rate is xed within the monetary union, any increase in prices
in the short run in one region relative to the other must eventually be reversed in the long run.
This implies that even though relative short-term real interest rates fall in response to government
spending shocks in our model, relative long-term real interest rates don't (in contrast to the zero
lower bound setting). It is the fall in long-term real interest rates that generates a high multiplier
in the zero lower bound setting. The absence of such a fall in our setting explains why the open
economy relative multiplier generated by the New Keynesian model is much lower than the closed
economy aggregate multiplier at the zero lower bound.
The intuition for why the open economy relative multiplier is larger than the closed economy
aggregate multiplier for normal monetary policy is similar to the intuition for why the government
spending multiplier is larger under a xed than a 
exible exchange rate in the Mundell-Fleming
model. In fact, we show that the open economy relative multiplier is exactly the same as the aggre-
gate multiplier in a small open economy with a xed exchange rate. Our estimate can, therefore, be
compared with other estimates of multipliers in open economies with xed exchange rates. Based on
data from 44 countries, Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh (2010) estimate a multiplier of 1.5 for countries
that operate a xed exchange rate regime, but a much lower multiplier for countries operating a

exible exchange rate regime.7
An important dierence between our open economy relative multiplier and the closed economy
aggregate multiplier is that the regions that receive spending don't have to pay for it. Could this
perhaps explain the \large" relative multiplier we estimate? In the Neoclassical model, negative
7Kraay (2011) estimates a government spending multiplier of about 0.5 for 29 aid-dependent developing countries
using variation in World Bank lending.
4wealth eects actually raise the scal multiplier (since leisure is a normal good). The absence of this
eect in our setting, thus, lowers the open economy relative multiplier. Moreover, in our setting,
agents are getting paid to produce goods and services that are used for defense of the union as a
whole. If labor and product markets were competitive, they would be indierent at the margin as to
whether they get more or less such work. Our open economy relative multiplier is, therefore, quite
dierent from a \windfall" or \manna from heaven" multiplier. The model we develop captures
these features.
The theoretical framework we describe helps to interpret recent and ongoing research on the
eects of other forms of local government spending (Acconcia et al., 2011; Chodorow-Reich et al.,
2011; Clemens and Miran, 2010; Cohen et al., 2010; Fishback and Kachanovskaya, 2010; Serrato
and Wingender, 2010; Shoag, 2010; Wilson, 2011). In general, these studies appear to estimate open
economy relative multipliers of a similar magnitude as we do. There are, however, a few potentially
important dierences between our study and these. Some of these studies focus on windfall transfers
rather than purchases. One advantage of our focus on military purchases is that it seems reasonable
to assume that they are separable from other forms of consumption, as is typically assumed in
macroeconomic models.
Our empirical approach builds on previous work by Davis, Loungani, and Mahidhara (1997), who
study several drivers of regional economic 
uctuations, including military procurement.8 Several
other studies on the impact of regional defense spending are surveyed in Braddon (1995). The most
important dierence in our empirical methodology relative to these studies is our use of variation
in aggregate military spending in creating instruments to account for potential endogeneity of local
procurement spending. Our work is also related to Canova and Pappa (2007), who study the price
eects of scal shocks in a monetary union. Our theoretical analysis is related to earlier work
on monetary and scal policy in a monetary union by Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Gali and
Monacelli (2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 described the data we use. Section
3 presents our empirical results. Section 4 presents the model we use to interpret these empirical
results. Section 5 presents our theoretical results. Section 6 concludes.
8Similarly, Hooker and Knetter (1997) estimate the eects of military procurement on subsequent employment
growth using a somewhat dierent specication.
52 Data
Relative to other forms of federal government spending, the geographical distribution of military
spending is remarkably well documented, perhaps because of the intense political scrutiny surround-
ing these purchases. Our main source for military spending data is the electronic database of DD-350
military procurement forms available from the US Department of Defense. These forms document
military purchases of everything from repairs of military facilities to the purchase of aircraft carriers.
They cover purchases greater than $10,000 up to 1983 and greater than $25,000 thereafter.9 These
data are for the federal government scal year.10 We have used the DD-350 database to compile
data on total military procurement by state and year for 1966-2006.11
The DD-350 forms list prime contractors and provide information on the location where the ma-
jority of the work was performed. An important concern is the extent of inter-state subcontracting.
To help assess the extent of such subcontracting, we have compiled a new dataset on shipments to
the government from defense oriented industries. The source of these data are the Annual Survey of
Shipments by Defense-Oriented Industries conducted by the US Census Bureau from 1963 through
1983. In section 3.2, we compare variation in procurement spending with these shipments data.
Our primary measure of state output is the GDP by state measure constructed by the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which is available since 1963. We also make use of analogous
data by major SIC/NAICS grouping.12 We use the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) payroll survey
from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) program to measure state-level employment. We
also present results for the BEA measure of state employment which is available since 1969. We
obtain state population data from the Census Bureau.13
Finally, to analyze price eects, we construct state and regional in
ation measures from several
sources. Before 1995, we rely on state-level in
ation series constructed by Marco Del Negro (1998)
9Purchases reported on DD-350 forms account for 90% of military purchases. DD-1057 forms are used to summarize
smaller transactions but do not give the identity of individual sellers. Our analysis of census shipment data in section
3 suggests DD-350 purchases account for almost all of the time-series variation in total military procurement.
10Since 1976, this has been from October 1st to September 30th. Prior to 1976, it was from July 1st to June 30th.
11The electronic military prime contract data le was created in the mid-1960's and records individual military
prime contracts since 1966. This occurred around the time Robert McNamara was making sweeping changes to
the procurement process of the U.S. Department of Defense. Aggregate statistics before this point do not appear
to be a reliable source of information on military purchases since large discrepancies arise between actual outlays
and procurement for the earlier period, particularly at the time of the Korean war. See the Department of Defense
Greenbook for aggregate historical series of procurement and outlays.
12The data are organized by SIC code before 1997 and NAICS code after 1997. BEA publishes the data for both
systems in 1997, allowing the growth rate series to be smoothly pasted together.
13Between census years, population is estimated using a variety of administrative data sources including birth and
death records, IRS data, Medicare data and data from the Department of Defense. Since 1970, we are also able to
obtain population by age group, which allows us to construct estimates of the working age population.
6for the period 1969-1995 using a combination of BLS regional in
ation data and cost of living
estimates from the American Chamber of Commerce Realtors Association (ACCRA).14 After 1995,
we construct state-level price indexes by multiplying a population-weighted average of cost of living
indexes from the American Chamber of Commerce Realtors Association (ACCRA) for each region
with the US aggregate Consumer Price Index. Reliable annual consumption data are unfortunately
not available at the state level for most of the time period or regions we consider.15
3 Measurement of the Open Economy Relative Multiplier
3.1 Empirical Specication and Identication
We use variation in military procurement spending across states and regions to identify the eects
of government spending on output. Our empirical specication is
Yit   Yit 2
Yit 2





where Yit is per-capita output in region i in year t, Git is per-capita military procurement spending
in region i in year t, and i and 
t represent state and year xed eects.16 The inclusion of state xed
eects implies that we are allowing for state specic time trends in output and military procurement
spending. The inclusion of time xed eects allows us to control for aggregate shocks and aggregate
policy|such as changes in distortionary taxes and aggregate monetary policy. All variables in the
regression are measured in per capita terms. We run the regression on biannual data, as a crude way
of capturing dynamics in the relationship between government spending and output.17 We use panel
data on state and regional output and spending for 1966-2006. The regional data are constructed
by aggregating state-level data within Census divisions. We make one adjustment to the Census
divisions. This is to divide the \South Atlantic" division into two parts because of its large size.18
14See Appendix A of Del Negro (1998) for the details of this procedure.
15Retail sales estimates from Sales and Marketing Management Survey of Buying Power have sometimes been used
as a proxy for state-level annual consumption. However, these data are constructed by using employment data to
impute retail sales between census years, rendering them inappropriate for our purposes. Fishback, Horrace, and
Kantor (2004) study the longer run eects of New Deal spending on retail sales using Census data.
16We de
ate both regional output and military procurement spending using the national CPI for the United States.
17An alternative approach would be to run the regression on annual data and include lags (and possibly also leads)
of government spending on the right hand side. We have explored this and found that our biannual regression captures
the bulk of the dynamics in a parsimonious way. We nd small positive coecients on further leads and lags. This
suggests that we are likely slightly underestimating the multiplier.
18We place Delaware, Maryland, Washington DC, Virginia and West Virginia in one region, and North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia and Florida in the other.
7This yields ten regions made up of contiguous states. Our interest focuses on the coecient  in
regression (1), which we refer to as the \open economy relative multiplier."
An important challenge to identifying the eect of government spending is that government
spending is potentially endogenous since military spending is notoriously political.19 We therefore
estimate equation (1) using an instrumental variables approach. Our instruments are based on
two characteristics of the evolution of military spending. Figure 1 plots the evolution of military
procurement spending relative to output for California and Illinois as well as for the U.S. as a
whole. First, notice that most of the variation in national military spending is driven by geopolitical
events|such as the Vietnam war, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 9/11. Second, it is clear from
the gure that military spending in California is systematically more sensitive to movements in
national military spending than military spending in Illinois. The 1966-1971 Vietnam war draw-
down illustrates this. Over this period, military procurement in California fell by 2.5 percentage
points (almost twice the national average), while military procurement in Illinois fell by only about
1 percentage point (about 2/3 the national average). We use this variation in the sensitivity of
military spending across regions to national military build-ups and draw-downs to identify the eects
of government spending shocks. Our identifying assumption is that the U.S. does not embark on
a military build-up because states that receive a disproportionate amount of military spending are
doing poorly relative to other states. This assumption is similar|but weaker than|the common
identifying assumption in the empirical literature on the eects of national military spending, that
variation in national military spending is exogenous to the U.S. business cycle.
We employ two separate approaches to constructing instruments that capture the dierential
sensitivity of military spending across regions to national military build-ups and draw-downs. Our
baseline approach is to instrument for state or region military procurement using total national
procurement interacted with a state or region dummy. The \rst stage" in the two-stage least
squares interpretation of this procedure is to regress state spending on aggregate spending and xed
eects allowing for dierent sensitivities across dierent states. This yields scaled versions of national
spending as tted values for each state. Table 1 lists the states for which state procurement spending
is most sensitive to variation in national procurement spending. We also employ a simpler \Bartik"
approach to constructing instruments (Bartik, 1991). In this case, we scale national spending for
each state by the average level of spending in that state relative to state output in the rst ve
19See Mintz (1992) for a discussion of political issues related to the allocation of military procurement spending.
8years of our sample.20
We estimate the eects of military spending on employment and in
ation using an analogous
approach. For employment, the regression is analogous to equation (1) except that the left-hand
side variable is (Lit   Lit 2)=Lit 2|where Lit is the employment rate (employment divided by
population). For the in
ation regression, the left-hand side variable is (Pit   Pit 2)=Pit 2, where
Pit is the price level.
U.S. states and regions are much more open economies than the U.S. as a whole. Using data
from the U.S. Commodity Flow Survey and National Income and Product Accounts, we estimate
that roughly 30% of the consumption basket of the typical region we use in our analysis is imported
from other regions (see section 4.4 for details). Even though a large majority of goods are imported,
the overall level of openness of U.S. regions is not higher than 30% because services account for
a large fraction of output and are much more local. This estimate suggests that our regions are
comparable in openness to mid-sized European countries such as Spain or Portugal.
3.2 Subcontracting of Prime Military Contracts
An important question with regard to the use of prime military contract data is to what extent the
interpretation of these data might be aected by subcontracting to rms in other states. Fortu-
nately, a second source of data exists on actual shipments to the government from defense oriented
industries. These data were gathered by the Census Bureau over the period 1963-1983 as an ap-
pendage to the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. They have rarely been used, perhaps because no
electronic version has existed. We digitized these data from microlm.
Figure 2 illustrates the close relationship between these shipment data and the military procure-
ment data for several states over this period|giving us condence in the prime military contract
data as a measure of the timing and magnitude of regional military production. To summarize this
relationship, we estimate the following regression of shipments from a particular state on military
procurement,
MSit = i + MPSit + it; (2)
where MSt is the value of shipments from the Census Bureau data and MPSit is military pro-
curement spending. This regression yields a point estimate of  = 0:96, indicating that military
20Nekarda and Ramey (2011) use a similar approach to instrument for government purchases from particular in-
dustries. They use data at 5 year intervals to estimate the share of aggregate government spending from dierent
industries.
9procurement moves on average one-for-one with the value of shipments. The small dierences be-
tween the two series probably indicates that they both measure regional production with some error.
As we discuss below, one advantage of the instrumental variables approach we adopt is that it helps
adjust for this type of measurement error.
3.3 Eects of Government Spending Shocks
The rst row of Table 2 reports the open economy relative multiplier  in regression (1) for our
baseline instruments. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by regions or states.21 In
the second row of Table 2, we present an analogous set of results using a broader measure of military
spending that combines military procurement spending with compensation of military employees for
each state or region. We present results for output both de
ated by national CPI and our measure
of state CPI.
The point estimates of  for the output regression range from 1.4 to 1.9, while the point estimates
of  for the employment regression range from 1:3 to 1:8. The estimates using regional data are,
in general, slightly larger than those based on state data, though the dierences are small and
statistically insignicant. The point estimates of the eects of military spending on consumer prices
are statistically insignicantly dierent from zero, ranging from small positive to small negative
numbers.
These results control for short-term movements in population associated with government spend-
ing by running the regressions on per-capita variables. The last column of Table 2 looks directly at
population movements by estimating an analogous specication to equation (1) where the left-hand
side variable is (Popit   Popit 2)=Popit 2 and the right-hand side government spending variable is
constructed from the level of government spending and output rather than per-capita government
spending and output. We nd that the population responses to government spending shocks are
small and cannot be distinguished from zero for the two year time horizon we consider.22
Figure 3 gives a visual representation of our main specication for output. The gure plots aver-
ages of changes in output against predicted military spending (based on our rst-stage regression),
grouped by 30 quantiles of the predicted military spending variable. Both variables are demeaned
by year and state xed eects. The vast majority of points in the gure are located in the NE and
21Our standard errors thus allow for arbitrary correlation over time in the error term for a given state. They also
allow for heteroskedasticity.
22Our estimates appear consistent with existing estimates of regional population dynamics. Blanchard and Katz
(1992) show that population dynamics are important in determining the dynamics of unemployment over longer
horizons.
10SW quadrants, leading to a positive coecient in our IV regression. To assess the robustness of our
results to outliers, we have experimented with dropping states and regions with especially large or
small estimated sensitivity of spending to national spending and this slightly raises the estimated
multiplier.23
In Table 3, we report results for the simpler \Bartik" approach to constructing instruments.
For output, this approach yields a multiplier of roughly 2.5 for the states and 2.8 for the regions.
For employment, this approach also yields larger multipliers than our baseline specication|1.8 for
states and 2.5 for regions. Our estimates using the Bartik instruments are somewhat less precise
than those using our baseline instruments. This arises because in constructing this instrument, we
use the level of spending in each state as a proxy for the sensitivity of state spending to national
spending|but it is an imperfect proxy.
Table 3 also reports a number of alternative specications for the eects of military procurement
on output and employment designed to evaluate the robustness of our results. We report the output
multiplier when per-capita output is constructed using a measure of the working age population
as opposed to the total population.24 We add the price of oil interacted with state dummies as
controls to our baseline regression. We add the real interest rate interacted with state dummies
as controls to our baseline regression. We estimate the employment regression using the BEA's
employment series (available from 1969) instead of BLS payroll employment. Table 3 shows that
these specications all yield similar results to our baseline estimates.
We have extensively investigated the small-sample properties of our estimation approach using
Monte Carlo simulations. These simulations indicate that neither the regional regressions nor the
regressions using the Bartik instruments suer from bias associated with weak or many instruments.
However, our estimates of the state regressions using our baseline instruments are likely to be con-
servative in the sense of underestimating the scal multiplier for states by roughly 10% (implying
that the true state-level multiplier is 1.65 rather than 1.43). Intuitively, this downward bias arises
because instrumental variables does not fully correct for endogeneity in small samples when instru-
ments are weak or when many instruments are used|i.e., IV is biased in the direction of OLS.25
23MO and CT have substantially higher estimated sensitivity of spending to national spending than other states
and ND has a substantially negative estimated sensitivity (alone among the states). Dropping any combination of
these states from our baseline regression slightly raises the our multiplier estimate. Dropping all three yields 1.88
(0.57).
24State-level measures of population by age-group are available from the Census Bureau starting in 1970. We dene
the working age population as the population between the ages of 19 and 64.
25See Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) for an overview of this issue. The concern is that the rst-stage of the
IV procedure may pick up some of the endogenous variation in the explanatory variable in the presence of a large
number of instruments. In contrast to the canonical examples discussed in Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), this
11Table 3 also reports results using the LIML estimator, which is not aected by the presence of many
instruments. This yields an output multiplier of roughly 2.0.26 Our Monte Carlo simulation also
allows us to assess the small sample properties of the standard errors we report. Our simulations
imply that the asymptotic standard errors for the region regressions are slightly smaller than their
small-sample counterparts: the standard 95% condence interval based on the standard errors re-
ported in Table 2 is in fact a 90% condence interval. This adjustment arises from the well-known
small-sample bias in clustered standard errors in the presence of a small number of clusters. This
does not apply to the state-level regressions for which the asymptotic standard errors almost exactly
replicate the small sample results from our simulations.
A potential concern with interpreting our results would arise if states receiving large amounts of
military spending were more cyclically sensitive than other states. We have compared the cyclical
sensitivity of state that receive large and small amounts of military spending. The standard devi-
ation of output growth is the same for states and regions with above-median military spending as
below median (4.7% for regions and 6.1% for states), indicating that a dierence in overall cyclical
sensitivity is not driving our results.27
Ramey (2011) argues that news about military spending leads actual spending by several quar-
ters and that this has important implications for the estimation of scal multipliers. When we
add future spending as a regressor in regression (1), the coecient on this variable is positive and
the sum of the coecients on the government spending rises somewhat. This suggests that our
baseline specication somewhat underestimates the multiplier by ignoring output eects associated
with anticipated future spending.
Table 3 also presents OLS estimates of our baseline specication for output. The OLS estimates
actually biases us away from nding a statistically signicant result in small samples, since the OLS estimates in
our case are close to zero. Our Monte Carlo analysis is roughly consistent with the asymptotic results reported in
Stock and Yogo (2005). The partial R-squared of the excluded instruments, a statistic frequently used to gauge the
\strength" of instruments is 12% for the state regressions and 18% for the region regressions. However, because we
use a large number of instruments in our baseline case|one for each state or region|the Cragg-Donald (1993) rst
stage F-statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) is roughly 5 for our baseline specication of the state-level
regressions and 8 for the region-level regressions. It is 48 for the simpler Bartik instrument specication. Our Monte
Carlo analysis indicates that while the large number of instruments in the state-level specication leads to a slight
downward-bias in the coecient on government spending, the standard error on this coecient is unbiased because
of the high R-squared of our instruments taken as a whole. We thank Marcelo Moreira, James Stock and Motohiro
Yogo for generous advice on this issue.
26See Stock and Yogo (2005) for a discussion of the LIML estimator's properties in settings with many instruments.
The disadvantage of LIML is that its distribution has fat tails and, thus, yields large standard errors.
27Furthermore, suppose we regress state output growth Yit on scaled national output growth siYt, where the
scaling factor si is the average level of military spending in each state relative to state output, as well as state and
time xed eects. If state with high si are more cyclically sensitive, this regression should yield a positive coecient
on siYt. In fact, the coecient is slightly negative in our data. In contrast, when siYt is replaced with siGt,
this regression yields a large positive coecient.
12are substantially lower than our instrumental variables estimates. A natural explanation for this is
that states' elected ocials may nd it easier to argue for spending at times when their states are
having trouble economically. Our instruments also likely correct for measurement error in the data
on state-level prime military contracts that does not arise at the national level. Such measurement
error causes an \attenuation bias" in the OLS coecient toward zero.28
Table 4 presents the results for equation (1) estimated separately by major SIC/NAICS group-
ings. An important point evident from Table 4 is that increases in government sector output
contribute negligibly to the overall eects we estimate. The table also shows that increases in rel-
ative procurement spending are not associated with increases in other forms of military output.
Statistically signicant output responses occur in the construction, manufacturing, retail and ser-
vices sectors. Eects on measured output in the government sector are less easily interpretable than
eects on output in the private sector since much of government output is measured using input
costs. Transfers associated with increases in public sector wages are therefore dicult to distinguish
from changes in actual output.
3.4 Government Spending at High Versus Low Unemployment Rates
We next investigate whether the eects of government spending on the economy are larger in periods
when the unemployment rate is already high. There are a variety of reasons why this could be the
case. Most often cited is the idea that in an economy with greater slack, expansionary government
spending is less likely to crowd out private consumption or investment.29 A second potential source
of such dierences is the dierential response of monetary policy|central bankers may have less
incentive to \lean against the wind" to counteract the eects of government spending increases if
unemployment is high. We show in section 5, however, that this second eect does not aect the
size of the open economy relative multiplier since aggregate policy is \dierenced out."
To investigate these issues, we estimate the following regression,
Yit   Yit 2
Yit 2








28In section 3.2 below, we describe an alternative source of data on military procurement based on shipments
to the government from defense oriented industries. Despite the close correspondence between the prime military
contract data and the shipments data, small dierences remain in the growth rates for the two series. Viewing these
as independent (but noisy) measures on the magnitude of spending, we can adjust for measurement error by using
one variable as an instrument for the other. We nd that this signicantly raises the multiplier relative to the OLS
estimates.
29This might arise, for example, if unemployment leads to a higher labor supply elasticity (Hall, 2009) or because
of tighter capacity constraints in booms (Gordon and Krenn, 2010).
13where Il is an indicator for a period of low economic slack, and the eects of government spending
in high and low slack periods are given by h and l respectively. We dene high and low slack
periods in terms of the unemployment rate at the start of the interval over which the government
spending occurs. Specically, period t is dened as a high slack period if Ut 2 is above its median
value over our sample period.30
Table 5 presents our estimates of equation (3). The point estimates support the view that
the eects of government spending are larger when unemployment is high. Depending on the
specication, the government spending multiplier lies between 2 and 3.5 in the high slackness periods,
substantially above our estimates for the time period as a whole. Given the limited number of
business cycles in our sample, we are not, however, able to estimate these eects with much statistical
precision. The dierence in the multiplier in the high and low spending periods is moderately
statistically signicant (with a P-value of 0.06) only in the case of the state-level output regression.
4 A Model of Government Spending in a Monetary Union
In this section, we develop a framework to help us interpret the \open economy relative multiplier"
that we estimate in section 3, and relate is to the \closed economy aggregate multiplier," which has
been the focus of most earlier work on government spending multipliers. Many of the issues that
arise in interpreting the open economy relative multiplier also arise in the international economics
literature. The model we develop, therefore, draws heavily on earlier work on open economy business
cycle models (Obstfeld and Rogo, 1995; Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2002), and, in particular,
the literature on monetary unions (Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Gali and Monacelli, 2008).
The model consists of two regions that belong to a monetary and scal union. We refer to the
regions as \home" and \foreign." Think of the home region as the region in which the government
spending shock occurs { a U.S. state or small group of states { and the foreign region as the rest
of the economy. The population of the entire economy is normalized to one. The population of the
home region is denoted by n. Household preferences, market structure and rm behavior take the
same form in both regions. Below, we describe the economy of the home region.
30The high slack years t according to this measure are: 1966, 1967, 1972-1974, 1976-1988, 1993, 1994, 2004 and
2005. We have also considered dening high slack years based on regional unemployment rates relative to their median
values. This yields very similar results.
144.1 Households
The home region has a continuum of household types indexed by x. A household's type indicates






where  denotes the household's subjective discount factor, Ct denotes household consumption of a
composite consumption good, Lt(x) denotes household supply of dierentiated labor input x. There
are an equal (large) number of households of each type.



















where CHt and CFt denote the consumption of composites of home and foreign produced goods,
respectively. The parameter  > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods and H and F are preference parameters that determine the household's relative preference
for home and foreign goods. It is analytically convenient to normalize H + F = 1. If H > n,
household preferences are biased toward home produced goods.














where cht(z) and cft(z) denote consumption of variety z of home and foreign produced goods,
respectively. There is a continuum of measure one of varieties in each region. The parameter  > 1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between dierent varieties.
Goods markets are completely integrated across regions. Home and foreign households thus face
the same prices for each of the dierentiated goods produced in the economy. We denote these
prices by pht(z) for home produced goods and pft(z) for foreign produced goods. All prices are
denominated in a common currency called \dollars."
Households have access to complete nancial markets. There are no impediments to trade in
nancial securities across regions. Home households of type x face a 
ow budget constraint given
by
PtCt + Et[Mt;t+1Bt+1(x)]  Bt(x) + (1   t)Wt(x)Lt(x) +
Z 1
0
ht(z)dz   Tt; (7)
where Pt is a price index that gives the minimum price of a unit of the consumption good Ct,
Bt+1(x) is a random variable that denotes the state contingent payo of the portfolio of nancial
15securities held by households of type x at the beginning of period t + 1, Mt;t+1 is the stochastic
discount factor that prices these payos in period t, t denotes a labor income tax levied by the
government in period t, Wt(x) denotes the wage rate received by home households of type x in
period t, ht(z) is the prot of home rm z in period t and Tt denotes lump sum taxes.31 To rule
out Ponzi schemes, household debt cannot exceed the present value of future income in any state of
the world.
Households face a decision in each period about how much to spend on consumption, how many
hours of labor to supply, how much to consume of each dierentiated good produced in the economy
and what portfolio of assets to purchase. Optimal choice regarding the trade-o between current










as well as a standard transversality condition. Subscripts on the function u denote partial deriva-
tives. Equation (8) holds state-by-state for all j > 0. Optimal choice regarding the intratemporal
trade-o between current consumption and current labor supply yields a labor supply equation:
u`(Ct;Lt(x))
uc(Ct;Lt(x))




Households optimally choose to minimize the cost of attaining the level of consumption Ct. This
implies the following demand curves for home and foreign goods and for each of the dierentiated













































As we noted above, the problem of the foreign household is analogous. We therefore refrain
from describing it in detail here. It is, however, useful to note that combining the home and foreign
31The stochastic discount factor Mt;t+1 is a random variable over states in period t+1. For each such state it equals
the price of the Arrow-Debreu asset that pays o in that state divided by the conditional probability of that state.
See Cochrane (2005) for a detailed discussion.






where Qt = P
t =Pt is the real exchange rate. This is the \Backus-Smith" condition that describes
optimal risk-sharing between home and foreign households (Backus and Smith, 1993). For simplicity,
we assume that all households|in both regions|initially have an equal amount of nancial wealth.
4.2 The Government
The economy has a federal government that conducts scal and monetary policy. Total government
spending in the home and foreign region follow exogenous AR(1) processes. Let GHt denote gov-
ernment spending per capita in the home region. Total government spending in the home region
is then nGHt. For simplicity, we assume that government demand for the dierentiated products













The government levies both labor income and lump-sum taxes to pay for its purchases of goods.
Our assumption of perfect nancial markets implies that any risk associated with variation in lump-
sum taxes and transfers across the two regions is undone through risk-sharing. Ricardian equivalence
holds in our model. We describe the policy for labor income taxes in section 5.
The federal government operates a common monetary policy for the two regions. This policy
consists of the following augmented Taylor-rule for the economy-wide nominal interest rate:
^ rn
t = r^ rn
t 1 + (1   i)(^ 
ag
t + y^ y
ag
t + g^ g
ag
t ); (16)
where hatted variables denote percentage deviations from steady state. The nominal interest rate
is denoted ^ rn
t . It responds to variation in the weighted average of consumer price in
ation in the
two regions ^ 
ag
t = n^ t+(1 n)^ 
t, where ^ t is consumer price in
ation in the home region and ^ 
t is
consumer price in
ation in the foreign region. It also responds to variation in the weighted average
of output in the two regions ^ y
ag
t = n^ yt +(1 n)^ y
t. Finally, it may respond directly to the weighted
average of the government spending shock in the two regions ^ g
ag
t = n^ gt + (1   n)^ g
t.
4.3 Firms
There is a continuum of rms indexed by z in the home region. Firm z specializes in the production
of dierentiated good z, the output of which we denote yt(z). In our baseline model, labor is the only
17variable factor of production used by rms. Each rm is endowed with a xed, non-depreciating
stock of capital.32 The production function of rm z is
yt(z) = f(Lt(z)): (17)
The function f is increasing and concave. It is concave because there are diminishing marginal
returns to labor given the xed amount of other inputs employed at the rm. Labor is immobile
across regions. Our model yields very similar results to a model in which labor and capital are
assumed to be equally mobile and the government spending shock is to per capita spending.33 We
follow Woodford (2003) in assuming that each rm belongs to an industry x and that there are
many rms in each industry. The goods in industry x are produced using labor of type x and all
rms in industry x change prices at the same time.




Mt;t+j[pt+j(z)yt+j(z)   Wt+j(x)Lt+j(z)]: (18)
Firm z must satisfy demand for its product. The demand for rm z's product comes from three
sources: home consumers, foreign consumers and the government. It is given by







Firm z is therefore subject to the following constraint:







Firm z takes its industry wage Wt(x) as given. Optimal choice of labor demand by the rm is
given by
Wt(x) = f`(Lt(z))St(z); (21)
where St(z) denotes the rm's nominal marginal cost (the Lagrange multiplier on equation (20) in
the rm's constrained optimization problem).
32Appendix B develops an extension of our baseline model with investment.
33If labor and capital are equally mobile, factor movements simply aect the relative size of the regions. For example,
a positive shock to the home region causes inward migration of both labor and capital and this makes the home region
larger. But in per capita terms the model is identical to a model without factor mobility (save a slight change in
home bias) as long as the government spending shock is dened in per-capita terms and the open economy relative
multiplier is thus virtually identical. In contrast, if labor is more mobile then capital, inward migration in response to
a positive government spending shock will lower the labor-capital ratio in the home region and through this channel
lower the per-capita government spending multiplier (and vice versa if capital is more mobile than labor).
18Firm z can reoptimize its price with probability 1    as in Calvo (1983). With probability 












k=0 kMt;t+k(nCHt+l + (1   n)CFt+k + nGHt+k)P
Ht+k
St+j(z): (22)
Intuitively, the rm sets its price equal to a constant markup over a weighted average of current
and expected future marginal cost.
4.4 Calibration of Preferences and Technology




1    1   
Lt(x)1+ 1




1    1 : (24)
In the rst utility specication, consumption and labor enter separably. They are therefore neither
complements nor substitutes. The second utility function is adopted from Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Human (1988). We refer to this utility function as representing GHH preferences. Consump-
tion and labor are complements for households with GHH preferences. Recently, Monacelli and
Perotti (2008), Bilbiie (2011), and Hall (2009) have emphasized the implications of consumption-
labor complementarities for the government spending multiplier.
For both specications of utility, we must specify values for  and  ( is irrelevant when utility
is separable and determined by other parameters in the GHH case). In both cases,  is the Frisch-
elasticity of labor supply. We set  = 1. This value is somewhat higher than values estimated
in microeconomic studies of employed workers, but relatively standard in macroeconomics. The
higher value is meant to capture variation in labor on the extensive margin|such as variation
in unemployment and retirement (Hall, 2009; Chetty, et al., 2011). As Hall (2009) emphasizes,
assuming a high labor supply elasticity raises the government spending multiplier. For the separable
utility specication,  denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). There is little
agreement within the macroeconomics literature on the appropriate values for the IES. Hall (1988)
estimates the IES to be close to zero, while Bansal and Yaron (2004), Gruber (2006) and Nakamura,
et al. (2011) argue for values above 1. We set  = 1, which yields balanced growth for the model
with separable preferences,  = 1. We set the subjective discount factor equal to  = 0:99, the
19elasticity of substitution across varieties equal to  = 7 and the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods to  = 2.34 Larger values of  yield more expenditure switching between
regions in response to regional shocks and thus lower open economy relative multipliers.
We assume the production function f(Lt(z)) = Lt(z)a and set a = 2=3. Regarding the frequency
with which rms can change their prices, we consider two cases:  = 0 (i.e., fully 
exible prices)
and  = 0:75 (which implies that rms reoptimize there prices on average once a year). Rigid prices
imply that relative prices across regions respond sluggishly to regional shocks. We set the size of the
home region to n = 0:1. This roughly corresponds to the size of the average region in our regional
regressions (where we divide the U.S. into 10 regions). We set the steady state value of government
purchases as a fraction of output to 0.2. We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions of the model
and use the methods of Sims (2001) to nd the unique bounded equilibrium.
We use data from the U.S. Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) and the U.S. National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) to set the home-bias parameter H. The CFS reports data on shipments
of goods within and between states in the U.S. It covers shipments between establishments in the
mining, manufacturing, wholesale and retail sectors. For the average state in 2002, 38% of shipments
were within state and 50% of shipments were within region. However, roughly 40% of all shipments
in the CFS are from wholesalers to retailers and the results of Hillberry and Hummels (2003) suggest
that a large majority of these are likely to be within region. Since the relevant shipments for our
model are those from manufacturers to wholesalers, we assume that 83% of these are from another
region (50 of the remaining 60 percent of shipments).
To calculate the degree of home bias, we must account for the fact that a substantial fraction
of output is services, which are not measured in the CFS. NIPA data indicate that goods represent
roughly 30% of U.S. GDP. If all inter-region trade were in goods|i.e., all services were local|
imports from other regions would amount to 25% of total consumption (30*0.83 = 25). However,
for the U.S. as a whole, services represent roughly 20% of international trade. Assuming that
services represent the same fraction of cross-border trade for regions, total inter-region trade is 31%
of region GDP (25/0.8 = 31). We therefore set H = 0:69. This makes our regions slightly more
open than Spain and slightly less open than Portugal. We set H so that overall demand for home
products as a fraction of overall demand for all products is equal to the size of the home population
relative to the total population of the economy. This implies that H = (n=(1   n))F.
34This is the same value for  as is used by Obstfeld and Rogo (2005), and only slightly higher than the values
used by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).
20We have so far calibrated the \fundamentals"|i.e., preferences and technology|for our model
economy. We leave the detailed description of government policy to the next section. We wish
to draw a clear distinction between fundamentals and government policy. The former determine
constraints on the potential eects of government policy. In contrast, monetary and scal policy
are under the government's control and therefore \choice variables" from the perspective of an
optimizing government, making it relevant to consider not only the policies that have persisted in
the past but also the potential eects of alternative government policies.
5 Theoretical Results
In this section, we analyze the eects of government spending shocks in the model presented in
section 4. We consider several dierent specication for the economy's \fundamentals" (separable
vs. GHH preferences, 
exible vs. sticky prices) as well as dierent specications for aggregate
monetary and tax policy. In the Neoclassical (
exible price) versions of the model, money is neutral
implying that the specication of monetary policy is irrelevant. Tax policy is, however, important
and we consider two specications for tax policy described below. In the New Keynesian (sticky
price) versions of the model, monetary policy is important and we consider three specications of
monetary policy within the class of interest rate rules described by equation (16).
The monetary policies we consider are: 1) a \Volcker-Greenspan" policy, 2) a\ xed real-rate"
policy and 3) a \xed nominal-rate" policy. These policies are designed to imply successively less
\leaning against the wind" by the central bank in response to in
ationary government spending
shocks. The \Volcker-Greenspan" policy is meant to mimic the policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve
during the Volcker-Greenspan period. For this case, we set the parameters in equation (16) to
 = 0:8,  = 1:5, y = 0:5 and g = 0.35 This specication of monetary policy implies that the
monetary authority aggressively raises the real interest rate to curtail the in
ationary eects of a
government spending shock.
Under the \xed real-rate" policy, the central bank maintains a xed real interest rate in response
to government spending shocks. However, to guarantee price-level determinacy, the central bank
responds aggressively to the in
ationary eects of all other shocks. Under the \xed nominal-rate
policy," central bank maintains a xed nominal interest rate in response to government spending
shocks. But as with the xed real-rate policy, it responds aggressively to the in
ationary eects of
35Many recent papers have estimated monetary rules similar to the one we adopt for the Volcker-Greenspan period
(see, e.g., Taylor, 1993 and 1999; Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000).
21all other shocks. We describe the details of how the xed real-rate and xed nominal-rate policies
are implemented in appendix A. The xed nominal-rate policy is a close cousin of the zero lower
bound scenario analyzed in detail in Eggertsson (2010), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011),
and Mertens and Ravn (2010). It is, in a sense, the opposite of the aggressive \leaning against the
wind" embodied in the Volcker-Greenspan policy because an in
ationary shock generates a fall in
real interest rates (since nominal rates are held constant). The xed real-rate policy charts a middle
ground.
We consider two specications for tax policy. Our baseline tax policy is one in which government
spending shocks are nanced completely by lump sum taxes. Under this policy, all distortionary
taxes remain xed in response to the government spending shock. The second tax policy we consider
is a \balanced budget" tax policy. Under this policy, labor income taxes vary in response to
government spending shocks such that the government's budget remains balanced throughout:
nPHtGHt + (1   n)PFtGFt = t
Z
Wt(x)Lt(x)dx; (25)
This policy implies that an increase in government spending is associated with an increase in dis-
tortionary taxes. We focus on the case of government spending shocks chosen to have roughly the
same persistence as aggregate military procurement spending, for which a linear model implies a
half-life of 2 years (i.e., an AR(1) coecient of 0:51=8  0:917). We also in some cases consider the
implications of more transitory government spending shocks.
We present results for both the closed economy aggregate multiplier that has been studied in
much of the previous literature and the open economy relative multiplier that we provide estimates
for in section 3 and has been the focus of much recent work using sub-regional data (Acconcia et
al., 2011; Chodorow-Reich et al., 2011; Clemens and Miran, 2010; Cohen et al., 2010; Fishback
and Kachanovskaya, 2010; Serrato and Wingender, 2010; Shoag, 2010; Wilson, 2011). We begin in
sections 5.1 and 5.2 by describing results for the case of additively separable preferences. We then
consider the case of GHH preferences in section 5.3. Finally, in section 5.4, we consider an extension
of our model that incorporates investment and variable capital utilization.
5.1 The Closed Economy Aggregate Multiplier
We dene the closed economy aggregate multiplier analogously to the previous literature on multi-
pliers (e.g., Barro and Redlick, 2011) as the response of total output (combining home and foreign





















t denotes aggregate output and G
agg
t denotes aggregate government spending. This
regression is identical to the one we use to measure the open economy relative multiplier|equation
(1)|except that we are using aggregate variables and have dropped the time xed eects. We
calculate this object by simulating quarterly data from the model described in section 4, time-
aggregating it up to an annual frequency, and running the regression (26) on this data.
The rst column of table 6 reports results on the closed economy aggregate multiplier. These
results clearly indicate that the closed economy aggregate multiplier is highly sensitive to aggregate
monetary and tax policy. In the New Keynesian model with a Volcker-Greenspan monetary policy,
it is quite low|only 0.22. The low multiplier arises because the monetary authority reacts to
the in
ationary eects of the increase in government spending by raising real interest rates. This
counteracts the expansionary eects of the spending shock. The closed economy aggregate multiplier
under Volcker-Greenspan policy is quite close to its value of 0.39 under 
exible prices (and constant
labor income tax rates). This should come as no surprise. \Good" monetary policy strives to
replicate the behavior of a 
exible price economy.
For monetary policies that respond less aggressively to in
ationary shocks, the closed econ-
omy multiplier can be substantially larger. For the constant real-rate policy, the multiplier is one
(Woodford, 2010). Intuitively, since the real interest rate remains constant rather than rising when
spending increases there is no \crowding out" of consumption, implying that output rises one-for-
one with government spending. For the constant nominal-rate policy, the multiplier is 1.70 if the
government spending shock is relatively transient (half-life of one-year, g = 0:85), but -0.39 for
the case of a more persistent government spending shock (half-life of two-years, g = 0:917). The
sensitivity of the closed economy aggregate multiplier under xed nominal-rate policy to the per-
sistence of government spending is closely related to issues discussed in Mertens and Ravn (2010).
Intuitively, if the government spending shock is in
ationary, it will lower the real interest rate
(since the nominal rate is constant) and this will boost the multiplier. However, the government
spending shock has both in
ationary eects (it increases aggregate demand at a given interest rate)
and de
ationary eects (labor supply shifts out since households are poorer). For relatively transi-
tory government spending shocks, the overall eect is in
ationary and the multiplier is large. For
suciently persistent government spending shocks, however, the overall eect can be de
ationary,
23leading to low multipliers.
The second panel of Table 6 presents results for the Neoclassical model. These results clearly
indicate that the closed economy aggregate multiplier also depends on the extent to which the
government spending is nanced by contemporaneous distortionary taxes. If the spending is nanced
by an increase in distortionary taxes in such a way as to maintain a balanced budget period-by-period
(as opposed to by lump sum taxes), the multiplier falls by about a fourth to 0.30. If distortionary
taxes are reduced in concert with an increase in government spending the aggregate multiplier can
be substantially higher (though we do not report this in the table).
It is useful to pause for a moment to consider why price rigidity|what distinguishes the New
Keynesian and Neoclassical models we consider|matters so much in determining eects of govern-
ment spending. For concreteness, consider a transitory shock to government spending at the zero
lower bound. This shock puts pressure on prices to rise. In the Neoclassical, prices immediately
jumping up and begin falling. This implies that the real interest rate rises on impact (because prices
are falling) and crowds out private spending. In the New Keynesian model, however, prices rise
only gradually since many are rigid in the short run. This implies that the real interest rate falls on
impact and thus boosts private spending. It is this dierence in the response of the real interest rate
to government spending shocks|caused by a dierence in the 
exibility of prices|that explains
the dierence in the multiplier across these models.
The sensitivity of the closed economy aggregate multiplier to aggregate monetary and tax policy
probably explains some of the wide range of estimates in the empirical literature. Most economists
agree that the extent to which the Federal Reserve has \leaned against the wind" has varied sub-
stantially over the last century, as illustrated for example by the dierent policy response during the
2007-2009 nancial crisis than the Great Depression (see also Clarida et al., 2000). This sensitivity
carries over to other variables. Much recent work on the eects of scal policy has focused on
consumption, real wages and markups (Ramey, 2010; Perotti, 2007). In our New Keynesian model
with Volcker-Greenspan monetary policy, the closed economy aggregate multiplier is negative for
all three of these variables, while it is positive for more accommodative monetary policy.
The enormous variation in possible values for the closed economy aggregate multiplier depending
on the policy environment underscores the diculty of using the closed economy aggregate multiplier
to distinguish among alternative views of how government spending aects the economy. Under
\normal" monetary policy (i.e., the Volcker-Greenspan policy), it may be exceedingly dicult to
distinguish between the Neoclassical and New Keynesian models. Both frameworks predict little
24eect of government spending on output. Yet this does not imply that the models have similar
implications overall. While the Neoclassical model continues to generate a low aggregate multiplier
in the xed nominal-rate scenario that we use to proxy for the zero lower bound, the New Keynesian
model can generate extremely large multipliers in this environment. In the next section, we illustrate
that the open economy relative multiplier has important advantages when it comes to distinguishing
between dierent views of how government spending aects the economy, because it is not sensitive
to the specication of aggregate monetary and tax policy but rather to the relative policies across
regions|which are precisely pinned down in a monetary and scal union.
5.2 The Open Economy Relative Multiplier
Contrast the wide range of dierent closed economy aggregate multipliers produced by our model
for dierent monetary policies with the complete stability of the open economy relative multiplier
reported in the second column of Table 6. The open economy relative multiplier is calculated by
estimating equation (1) using the regional data from the model|the same specication we use in
our empirical analysis. For all three specications of monetary policy we consider, the open economy
relative multiplier is 0.85. Furthermore, the fth and sixth row of Table 6 present result for the
dierent specications of tax policy in the Neoclassical model and illustrate that the open economy
relative multiplier is also completely insensitive to aggregate tax policy. The open economy relative
multiplier is sensitive to economic fundamentals (e.g., the degree of price rigidity) and to region-
specic policies (e.g., the persistence of the regional government spending shock) as we discuss
below.
Intuitively, the open economy relative multiplier is independent of aggregate policy because
we \dierence out" aggregate shocks and aggregate policy by including time xed eects in the
regression. In a monetary union, the monetary authority cannot respond to a shock in one region
by making monetary policy tighter in that region alone. The relative monetary policy between
the two regions is, therefore, held xed by the monetary union in a very precise way, regardless
of the stance of aggregate monetary policy. In this sense, the open economy relative multiplier is
akin to the closed economy aggregate multiplier for a relatively accommodative aggregate monetary
policy|more accommodative than U.S. monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan.
Since the relative nominal interest rate is constant in response to a regional government spending
shock, it is tempting to think that this situation is analogous to the zero lower bound, where the
nominal interest rate is xed at zero in response to government spending shocks. As in the zero
25lower bound case, an increase in relative government spending in the home region can raise expected
in
ation, lowering relative short-term real interest rates. However, unlike the zero lower bound case,
the relative long-term real interest rate does not fall in response to a scal shock. The scal shock
leads to an immediate rise in relative prices and expectations of further increases in the short term.
This lowers the relative short term real interest rate. However, since a transitory shock to spending
does not lead to a permanent change in relative prices and the exchange rate is xed within the
monetary union, any short term increase in prices in one region relative to the other region must be
undone by a fall in relative prices in that region later on.36 In fact, after their initial jump, relative
prices are anticipated to fall more in the long run than they are anticipated to rise further in the
short run. This implies that the relative long-term real interest rate actually rises slightly in the
home region in response to an increase in government spending.37
To more clearly see the intuition for this result, Figure 4 presents the impulse response of
the price level and the real interest rate in the home region relative to the foreign region after a
government spending shock in our model. The home price level rises for several periods, but then
falls back to its original level. This movement in prices implies that the real interest rate in the
home region initially falls, but then rises above its steady state level for a prolonged period. Figure
5 shows what happens to consumption in the home region relative to the foreign region after a
government spending shock. Despite the short-run fall in the real interest rate, consumption falls.
This is because households anticipate high real rates in the future|equivalently, they face a high
current long-term real interest rate|and therefore cut their consumption.
Since the relevant interest rate for consumption decisions|the long-term real interest rate|
actually rises slightly in response to an increase in government spending irrespective of the persis-
tence of the shock and other parameters, the xed relative nominal interest rate policy in a monetary
union is fundamentally dierent from a zero lower bound setting in a closed economy in which the
long-term real interest rate may fall in response to a government spending shock. The response of
relative long-term real interest rates in our setting is closest to the xed real interest rate case in
the closed economy setting. Table 6 shows that the open economy relative multiplier is, in fact, 0.85
for our baseline parameter values. This is far below the zero lower bound multipliers emphasized
by Eggertsson (2010) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), but just slightly lower than
36Parsley and Wei (1996) present evidence for rapid convergence of relative prices following regional shocks using
data for U.S. regions.
37Corsetti et al. (2011) show that the same logic holds for the case of a small open economy with a xed exchange
rate.
26the closed economy aggregate multiplier for a xed real rate monetary policy.
5.3 Model with GHH Preferences
The models we have considered so far have generated predictions for the open economy relative
multiplier substantially below the point estimate of roughly 1.5 that we obtained in section 3.
We next consider a model with GHH preferences that is capable of tting this feature of our
empirical estimates.38 GHH preferences imply that consumption and labor are complements. This
complementarity is intended to represent the extra consumption on food away from home, clothing,
gas and the like that often arises in the context of work (Aguiar and Hurst (2005) present empirical
evidence for such complementarities).39
Previous work by Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Bilbiie (2011) and Hall (2009) has shown that
allowing for complementarities between consumption and labor can have powerful implications for
the government spending multiplier. The basic intuition is that, in response to a government spend-
ing shock, households must work more to produce the additional output. This raises consumption
demand since consumption is complementary to labor. But to be able to consume more, still more
production must take place, further raising the eects on output.
The second column of table 7 presents estimates of the open economy relative multiplier for the
model with GHH preferences. The New Keynesian model with GHH preferences can match our
empirical ndings in section 3 of an open economy multiplier of roughly 1.5 (assuming g = 0:917 as
in the military spending data). As in the model with separable preferences, this statistic is entirely
insensitive to the specication of aggregate policies. For the case of more transitory government
spending shocks (g = 0:5), the open economy relative multiplier rises to 2:1. The Neoclassical
model, however, continues to generate a low multiplier (0.3) in this model.
Figure 6 plots relative output and consumption in the New Keynesian model with GHH prefer-
ences after a positive shock to home government spending. Both output and consumption rise on
impact by a little more than twice the amount of the shock. They then both fall more rapidly than
the shock. The fact that the initial rise in consumption is as large as the rise in output implies that
the home region responds to the shock by running a trade decit in the short run. Consumption
38Models with hand-to-mouth consumers of the type studied by Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) may also have
the potential to generate large open economy relative multipliers.
39Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2009) estimate a rich business cycle model with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009)
preferences|which nests GHH and King and Rebelo (1988) preferences as special cases. The values that they esti-
mate for the preference parameters of their model are those for which Jaimovich-Rebelo preferences reduce to GHH
preferences.
27eventually falls below its steady state level for a period of time. During this time, the home region
is running a trade surplus. Intuitively, the complementarity between consumption and labor implies
that home households want to shift their consumption towards periods of high work eort associated
with positive government spending shocks.
How does the introduction of GHH preference aect the closed economy aggregate multiplier?
The rst column of Table 7 reports the closed economy aggregate multiplier in our model with
GHH preferences. Under certain circumstances|in particular, the case of a xed nominal rate
rule meant to proxy for the zero lower bound|this model can generate an extremely large closed
economy aggregate multiplier. However, if monetary policy is highly responsive to output as in the
case of Volcker-Greenspan policy, or if the government spending shock is highly persistent, the New
Keynesian model with GHH preferences implies a low closed economy aggregate multiplier, just as
the Neoclassical model does.
Table 7 makes clear that the introduction of GHH preferences does not generically increase
the closed economy aggregate multiplier. In the Neoclassical model, introducing GHH preferences
lowers the closed economy aggregate multiplier (to zero) by eliminating the wealth eect on labor
supply.40 The introduction of GHH preferences also lowers the closed economy aggregate multiplier
in the New Keynesian model when monetary policy responds aggressively to the in
ationary eects
of government spending shocks|as in the case of the Volcker-Greenspan policy rule. For this policy,
the endogenous increase in real interest rates chokes o the chain of increases in output, employment
and consumption that otherwise generates a large multiplier in the GHH model. A key reason why
the introduction of GHH preferences raises the open economy relative multiplier when compared
to the case of separable preferences is thus that the monetary union implies an accommodative
\relative" monetary policy|suciently accommodative not to choke o the increase in relative
output.
Summing up our results thus far, our estimates of equation (1) based on the military procurement
data yield an open economy relative multiplier of roughly 1.5. This lies far above the open economy
relative multipliers for the Neoclassical model|which are below 0.5 for both separable preferences
and GHH preferences. Our empirical estimate of 1.5 is also substantially higher than the open
economy relative multiplier of 0.85 implied by the New Keynesian model with separable preferences.
40In the New Keynesian model, government spending shocks aect the markup of prices over marginal costs and
therefore aect output by shifting labor demand. Similarly, the open economy relative multiplier in the Neoclassical
model with GHH preferences is non-zero because the government spending shock shifts labor supply when it is written
in terms of the real product wage.
28The New Keynesian model with GHH preferences, however, is able to match the open economy
relative multiplier we estimate in the data. Our results are thus consistent with a model in which
demand shocks can have large eects on output|if monetary policy is suciently accommodative
(as it is at the zero lower bound) and the government spending shock is not too persistent.
5.4 Model with Variable Capital
In appendix B, we develop an extension of the model presented in section 4 that includes invest-
ment, capital accumulation and variable capital utilization. The specication that we adopt for
these features mirrors closely that of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Table 8 presents
open economy relative multipliers for several calibrations of this model with GHH preferences.41
Introducing investment into the model does not change the main message of the previous sections
regarding the relationship between the open economy relative multiplier and its closed economy
aggregate counterpart.
However, introducing investment allows for an additional margin of adjustment: increases in
government spending \crowd out" private investment, implying that a smaller increase in production
is needed to fulll the increase in aggregate demand associated with the government spending shock.
Matching the open economy relative multiplier that we estimated in our empirical analysis therefore
requires parameter values that make the economy more \elastic" than those we adopted in section
4.4. A key parameter in determining the multiplier (both aggregate and relative) is the elasticity of
labor supply, as emphasized by Hall (2009). Table 8 reports the open economy relative multiplier
both for our baseline parameterization and for a \high labor supply elasticity" parameterization in
which we set the Frisch-elasticity of labor supply to  = 25. This calibration of labor supply is
closer to the indivisible labor model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), which implies that the
economy acts as though it were populated by agents with an innite labor supply elasticity.42
Table 8 also presents open economy relative multiplier for employment and prices. The employ-
ment and output multipliers are similar in the model as in the data. The New Keynesian model
generates a small increase in relative in
ation in response to the increase in relative government
spending. This lines up well with our empirical ndings on relative in
ation. In this model, prices
adjust only gradually to demand shocks, due to price rigidity. In contrast, the Neoclassical model
41A disadvantage of introducing investment into the model is that the methods we use to implement the constant
real-rate and constant nominal-rate monetary policies are substantially more dicult to apply. We therefore focus on
the case of Volcker-Greenspan monetary policy for this model.
42King and Rebelo (1999) argue that introducing indivisible labor into business cycle models helps to improve the
models' t to the data along a number of dimensions.
29predicts that relative prices jump up on impact in the region hit by the spending shock, and then
fall gradually.
6 Conclusion
We study the eects of government spending on output in a monetary union. Our empirical analysis
makes use of historical data on military procurement spending across U.S. regions. We measure the
consequences of a dierential increase in military procurement spending in a particular region on
output, employment, and prices in that region relative to other regions in the union. Since regional
procurement spending is potentially determined partly by underlying economic conditions in the
region, we focus only on changes in relative procurement spending arising from aggregate military
build-ups or draw-downs. We use time xed eects to dierence out aggregate shocks and policy
that aect all regions. Our estimates imply an \open economy relative multiplier" of approximately
1.5.
We develop a framework for interpreting this open economy relative multiplier and relating it
to estimates of \closed economy aggregate multipliers." The closed economy aggregate multiplier
is highly sensitive to how strongly aggregate monetary and tax policy \leans against the wind." In
contrast, the open economy relative multiplier dierences out these eects because dierent regions
in the union share a common monetary and tax policy. Since the monetary authority cannot
raise interest rates dierentially in one region relative to other regions in response to a regional
spending shock, our open economy relative multiplier is akin to an aggregate multiplier for a more
accommodative monetary policy than the monetary policy seen in the United States under Volcker
and Greenspan. This implies that our high values of the open economy relative multiplier are not
inconsistent with lower aggregate multipliers found in the literature (e.g., Barro and Redlick, 2011).
Our estimate provides evidence in favor of models in which demand shocks can have large eects
on output. Among the models that we consider, a New Keynesian model with complementarities
between consumption and labor in the form of GHH preferences best matches the open economy
relative multiplier we estimate in the data. This model implies a low closed economy aggregate
multiplier for monetary policy that \leans against the wind" in the way monetary policy did in the
U.S. during the Volcker-Greenspan period. However, it implies that the closed economy aggregate
multiplier can be very large if monetary policy is suciently accommodative (as it is at the zero
lower bound) and if the increase in government spending is not too persistent.
30A Constant Real Rate Monetary Policy
The paper considers specications of monetary policy that hold the real or nominal interest rate
constant in response to a government spending shock. Here, we illustrate the method used to solve
for these monetary policy specications. We do this for the case of separable preference and a
monetary policy that holds the real interest rate constant. We use an analogous approach for the
case of GHH preference and the xed nominal-rate policy.
Consider the closed economy limit of our model. A log-linear approximation of the key equilib-
rium conditions of this model are
^ ct = Et^ ct+1   (^ rn
t   Et^ t+1); (27)






^ ct + ^ gt; (29)
where  = 1=(1 +  ) and   = (1    1)=a   1.
Using equation (29) to eliminate ^ ct from equations (27) and (28) yields






t   Et^ t+1) + (^ gt   Et^ gt+1); (30)
^ t = Et^ t+1 + y^ yt   g^ gt; (31)
where y = (  + (C=Y ) 1 1) and g = (C=Y ) 1 1.
An equilibrium with a xed real interest rate must satisfy
^ yt = Et^ yt+1 + (^ gt   Et^ gt+1); (32)
^ t = Et^ t+1 + y^ yt   g^ gt: (33)
We conjecture a solution of the form ^ y
t = ay^ gt, ^ 
t = a^ gt. Using the method of undetermined
coecients, it is easy to verify that such an equilibrium exists with
ay = 1; a = 
y g
1 g;
where g is the autoregressive coecient of the AR(1) process for ^ gt.
This equilibrium can be implemented with the following policy rule
^ rn
t = Et^ t+1 + (^ t   ^ 
t)
= ag^ gt + ^ t   a^ gt
= ^ t   a(   g)^ gt: (34)
31B Model with Capital
This appendix presents the an extension of the model presented in section 4 that incorporates
investment, capital accumulation and variable capital utilization. We adopt a specication for these
features that mirrors closely the specication in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
B.1 Households
Household preferences in the home region are given by equations (4)-(6) as before. Household
decisions regarding consumption, saving and labor supply are thus the same as before. However,
in addition to these choices, households own the capital stock, they choose how much to invest and
they choose the rate of utilization of the capital stock. Let  Kt denote the physical stock capital of
capital available for use in period t and It the amount of investment chosen by the household in
period t. For simplicity, assume that It is a composite investment good given by an index of all
the products produced in the economy analogous to equations (5)-(6) for consumption. The capital
stock evolves according to
 Kt+1 = (1   )  Kt + (It;It 1); (35)
where  denotes the physical depreciation of capital and  summarizes the technology for trans-
forming current and past investment into capital. Households choose the utilization rate ut of the
capital cost. The amount of capital services provided by the capital cost in period t is then given
by Kt = ut  Kt.
The budget constraint of households in the home region is given by
PtCt + PtIt + PtA(ut)  Kt + Et[Mt;t+1Bt+1(x)]
 Bt(x) + Wt(x)Lt(x) + Rk
tut  Kt +
Z 1
0
ht(z)dz   Tt: (36)
The dierences relative to the model presented in section 4 are the following. First, households
spend PtIt on investment. Second, they incur a cost PtA(ut)  Kt associated with utilizing the capital
stock. Here A(ut) denotes a convex cost function. Third, they receive rental income equal to Rk
tut  Kt
for supplying ut  Kt in capital services. Here Rk
t denotes the rental rate for a unit of capital services.
In addition to equations (8)-(11), (14) and a standard transversality condition, household op-
timization yields the following relevant optimality conditions. Optimal capital utilization sets the






32Optimal investment and capital accumulation imply
Dt1(It;It 1) + Et[Dt+12(It+1;It)] = uc(Ct;Lt(x)); (38)
Dt = (1   )EtDt+1 + Et[(A0(ut+1)ut+1   A(ut+1))uc(Ct+1;Lt+1(x))]; (39)
where Dt is the Lagrange multiplier on equation (35) and j(;) denotes the derivative of  with
respect to its jth argument.
B.2 Firms
The production function for rm z is
yt(z) = f(Lt(z);Kt(z)): (40)
The demand for rm z's product is given by
yt(z) = (nCHt + (1   n)C







Firm optimization then yields
Wt(x) = f`(Lt(z);Kt(z))St(z); (42)
Rk
t = fk(Lt(z);Kt(z))St(z); (43)
and a rm price setting equation given by equation (22).
B.3 Calibration
We set the rate of depreciation of capital to  = 0:025, which implies an annual depreciation rate









where (1) = 0(1) = 0 and I = 00(1) > 0. We set I = 2:5. This is the value estimated by
Christiano et al. (2005). We require that capital utilization ut = 1 in steady state, assume that
the cost of utilization function A1 = 0 and set a = A00(1)=A0(1) = 0:01. Again, this is the value
estimated by Christiano et al. (2005). We assume that the production function is Cobb-Douglas
with a capital share of 1/3.
33References
Acconcia, A., G. Corsetti, and S. Simonelli (2011): \Maa and Public Spending: Evidence
on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 8305.
Aguiar, M., and E. Hurst (2005): \Consumption versus Expenditure," Journal of Political
Economy, 113(5), 919{948.
Alesina, A., and S. Ardagna (2009): \Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes versus Spending,"
in Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24, ed. by J. R. Brown, pp. 35{68, Chicago IL. University
of Chicago Press.
Auerbach, A. J., and Y. Gorodnichenko (2011): \Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal
Policy," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming.
Backus, D. K., P. J. Kehoe, and F. E. Kydland (1994): \Dynamics of the Trade Balance and
the Terms of Trade: The J-Curve," American Economic Review, 84(1), 84{103.
Backus, D. K., and G. W. Smith (1993): \Consumption and Real Exchange Rates in Dynamic
Economies with Non-Traded Goods," Journal of International Economics, 35(3{4), 297{316.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron (2004): \Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset
Pricing Puzzles," Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1481{1509.
Barro, R. J., and C. J. Redlick (2011): \Macroeconomic Eects from Government Purchases
and Taxes," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, Forthcoming.
Bartik, T. J. (1991): Who Benets from State and Local Economic Development Policies? W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, MI.
Baxter, M., and R. G. King (1993): \Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium," American Economic
Review, 83(3), 315{334.
Benigno, G., and P. Benigno (2003): \Price Stability in Open Economies," Review of Economic
Studies, 70(4), 743{764.
Bilbiie, F. O. (2011): \Non-Separable Preferences, Frisch Labor Supply and the Consumption
Multiplier of Government Spending: One Solution to a Fiscal Policy Puzzle," Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, forthcoming.
Blanchard, O., and R. Perotti (2002): \An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic Eects
of Changes in Government Spending," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1329{1368.
Blanchard, O. J., and L. Katz (1992): \Regional Evolutions," Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, 1992(1), 1{75.
Braddon, D. (1995): \The Regional Impact of Defense Expenditure," in Handbook of Defense
Economics, ed. by K. Hartley, and T. Sandler, pp. 491{521, Amsterdam. Elsevier Science.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum, and J. Fisher (2004): \Fiscal Shocks and their Consequences,"
Journal of Economic Theory, 115, 89{117.
Calvo, G. A. (1983): \Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 12, 383{398.
Canova, F., and E. Pappa (2007): \Price Dierentials in Monetary Unions: The Role of Fiscal
Shocks," The Economic Journal, 117(520), 713{737.
Chari, V., P. J. Kehoe, and E. R. McGrattan (2002): \Can Sticky Price Models Generate
Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates," Review of Economic Studies, 69, 533{563.
34Chetty, R., A. Guren, D. Manoli, and A. Weber (2011): \Are Micro and Macro Labor
Supply Elasticities Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and Extensive Margins,"
American Economic Review, 101(3), 471{475.
Chodorow-Reich, G., L. Feiveson, Z. Liscow, and W. G. Woolston (2011): \Does State
Fiscal Relief During Recessions Increase Employment? Evidence from the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act," Working Paper, University of California at Berkeley.
Christiano, L., M. Eichenbaum, and S. Rebelo (2011): \When is the Government Spending
Multiplier Large?," Journal of Political Economy, 119, 78{121.
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum, and C. L. Evans (2005): \Nominal Rigidities and the
Dynamic Eects of a Shock to Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, 113(1), 1{45.
Clarida, R., J. Gali, and M. Gertler (2000): \Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic
Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 147{180.
Clemens, J., and S. Miran (2010): \The Eects of State Budget Cuts on Employment and
Income," Working Paper, Harvard University.
Cochrane, J. H. (2005): Asset Pricing. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, second edn.
Cogan, J. F., T. Cwik, J. B. Taylor, and V. Wieland (2010): \New Keynesian Versus
Old Keynesian Government Spending Multipliers," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
34(3), 281{295.
Cohen, L., J. Coval, and C. Mallow (2011): \Do Powerful Politicians Cause Corporate Down-
sizing?," Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
Corsetti, G., K. Kuester, and G. Muller (2011): \Floats, Pegs and the Transmission of
Fiscal Policy," CEPR Working Paper No. 8180.
Corsetti, G., A. Meier, and G. J. Muller (2009): \Fiscal Stimulus With Spending Reversals,"
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7302.
Cragg, J. G., and S. G. Donald (1993): \Testing Identiability and Specication in Instrumental
Variable Models," Econometric Theory, 9(2), 222{240.
Davis, S. J., P. Loungani, and R. Mahidhara (1997): \Regional Labor Fluctuations: Oil
Shocks, Military Spending, and Other Driving Forces," Working Paper, University of Chicago.
Del Negro, M. (1998): \Aggregate Risk Sharing Across US States and Across European Coun-
tries," Working Paper, Yale University.
Drautzburg, T., and H. Uhlig (2011): \Fiscal Stimulus and Distortionary Taxation," Working
Paper, University of Chicago.
Edelberg, W., M. Eichenbaum, and J. D. Fisher (1999): \Understanding the Eects of a
Shock to Government Purchases," Review of Economic Dynamics, 2, 166{206.
Eggertsson, G. B. (2010): \What Fiscal Policy Is Eective at Zero Interest Rates?," in NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2010, ed. by D. Acemoglu, and M. Woodford, Chicago IL. University of
Chicago Press.
Fishback, P., and V. Kachanovskaya (2010): \In Search of the Multiplier for Federal Spending
in the States During the New Deal," NBER Working Paper No. 16561.
Fishback, P. V., W. C. Horrace, and S. Kantor (2004): \Did New Deal Grant Programs
Stimulate Local Economies? A Study of Federal Grants and Retail Sales During the Great
Depression," Working Paper, University of Arizona.
35Fisher, J. D. M., and R. Peters (2010): \Using Stock Returns to Identify Government Spending
Shocks," Economic Journal, 120(544), 414{436.
Gali, J., D. Lopez-Salido, and J. Valles (2007): \Understanding the Eects of Government
Spending on Consumption," Journal of the European Economic Association, 5(1), 227{270.
Gali, J., and T. Monacelli (2008): \Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union,"
Journal of International Economics, 76(1), 116{132.
Gordon, R. J., and R. Krenn (2010): \The End of the Great Depression 1939-41: Policy
Contributions and Fiscal Multipliers," NBER Working Paper No. 16380.
Greenwood, J., Z. Hercowitz, and G. W. Huffman (1988): \Investment, Capacity Utilization
and the Real Business Cycle," American Economic Review, 78(3), 402{417.
Gruber, J. (2006): \A Tax-Based Estimate of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution," NBER
Working Paper No. 11945.
Hall, R. E. (1988): \Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption," Journal of Political Economy,
96(2), 339{357.
(2009): \By How Much Does GDP Rise if the Government Buys More Output?," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 183{249.
Hansen, G. D. (1985): \Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 16, 309{327.
Hillberry, R., and D. Hummels (2003): \Intranational Home Bias: Some Explanations," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 85(4), 1089{1092.
Hooker, M. A., and M. M. Knetter (1997): \The Eects of Military Spending on Economic
Activity: Evidence from State Procurement Spending," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
28(3), 400{421.
Ilzetzki, E., E. Mendoza, and C. Vegh (2010): \How Big (Small?) are Fiscal Multipliers?,"
NBER Working Paper No. 16479.
Jaimovich, N., and S. Rebelo (2009): \Can News about the Future Drive the Business Cycle?,"
American Economic Review, 99(4), 1097{1118.
King, R. G., and C. I. P. S. Rebelo (1988): \Production, Growth and Business Cycles: I. The
Basic Neoclassical Model," Journal of Monetary Economics, 21((2/3)), 195{232.
King, R. G., and S. T. Rebelo (1999): \Resuscitating Real Business Cycles," in Handbook of
Macroeconomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford, pp. 927{1007, Amsterdam, Holland.
Elsevier.
Kraay, A. (2011): \How Large is the Government Spending Multiplier? Evidence from World
Bank Lending," Working Paper, World Bank.
Mertens, K., and M. Ravn (2010): \Fiscal Policy in an Expectations Driven Liquidity Trap,"
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7931.
Mintz, A. (ed.) (1992): The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States. Rout-
ledge, New York.
Monacelli, T., and R. Perotti (2008): \Fiscal Policy, Wealth Eects, and Markups," NBER
Working Paper No. 14584.
36Mountford, A., and H. Uhlig (2009): \What are the Eects of Fiscal Policy Shocks?," Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 24(6), 960{992.
Nakamura, E., J. Steinsson, R. Barro, and J. Ursua (2011): \Crises and Recoveries in an
Empirical Model of Consumption Disasters," Working Paper, Columbia University.
Nekarda, C. J., and V. A. Ramey (2011): \Industry Evidence on the Eects of Government
Spending," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1), 36{59.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1995): \Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," Journal of Political
Economy, 103(3), 624{660.
(2005): \Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 2005(1), 67{146.
Ohanian, L. E. (1997): \The Macroeconomic Eects of War Finance in the United States: World
War II and the Korean War," American Economic Review, 87(1), 23{40.
Parsley, D. C., and S.-J. Wei (1996): \Convergence to the Law of One Price Without Trade
Barriers of Currency Fluctuations," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4), 1211{1236.
Perotti, R. (2007): \In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy," in NBER macroe-
conomics Annual 2007, ed. by D. Acemoglu, K. Rogo, and M. Woodford, pp. 169{226, Chicago
IL. University of Chicago Press.
Ramey, V. A. (2011): \Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It's All in the Timing," Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 126, Forthcoming.
Ramey, V. A., and M. D. Shapiro (1998): \Costly Capital Reallocation and the Eects of
Government Spending," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 48(1), 145{194.
Rogerson, R. (1988): \Indivisble Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium," Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 21, 3{16.
Romer, C., and J. Bernstein (2009): \The Job Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Plan," Council of Economic Advisers.
Schmitt-Grohe, S., and M. Uribe (2009): \What's News in Business Cycles," Working Paper,
Columbia University.
Serrato, J. C. S., and P. Wingender (2010): \Estimating Local Fiscal Multipliers," Working
Paper, University of California at Berkeley.
Shoag, D. (2010): \The Impact of Government Spending Shocks: Evidence on the Multiplier from
State Pension Plan Returns," Working Paper, Harvard University.
Sims, C. A. (2001): \Solving Linear Rational Expectations Model," Journal of Computational
Economics, 20, 1{20.
Stock, J. H., J. H. Wright, and M. Yogo (2002): \A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak
Identication in Generalized Method of Moments," Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
20(4), 518{529.
Stock, J. H., and M. Yogo (2005): \Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV Regression," in
Identication and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothemberg,
ed. by D. W. K. Andrews, and J. H. Stock, pp. 80{108, Cambridge, U.K. Cambridge University
Press.
Taylor, J. B. (1993): \Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series, 39, 195{214.
37(1999): \Staggered Price and Wage Setting in Macroeconomics," in Handbook of Macroe-
conomics, ed. by J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford, pp. 1009{1050, Amsterdam, Holland. Elsevier.
Wilson, D. J. (2011): \Fiscal Spending Jobs Multipliers: Evidence from the 2009 American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Woodford, M. (2003): Interest and Prices. Princton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
(2011): \Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier," American Eco-
nomic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1), 1{35.
38TABLE I











The table lists the 10 states for which state military procurement spending is most
sensitive to national military procurement spending in descending order.Population
States Regions States Regions States Regions States Regions States
1.43 1.85 1.35 1.85 1.28 1.76 0.03 -0.14 -0.12
(0.36) (0.58) (0.36) (0.71) (0.29) (0.62) (0.18) (0.65) (0.17)
1.61 1.62 1.36 1.45 1.39 1.51 0.19 0.06 0.07
(0.40) (0.84) (0.39) (0.88) (0.32) (0.90) (0.16) (0.41) (0.21)
Num. Obs.  1989 390 1989 390 1989 390 1785 350 1989
Prime Contracts plus 
Military Compensation
The dependent variable is stated at top of each column. Each cell in the table reports results for a different regression with the main
regressor of interest listed in the far left column. Standard errors are in parentheses. Military spending variables are per capita except in
Population regression. All regressions include region and time fixed effects, and are estimated by two stage least squares. The sample
period is 1966-2006 for output, employment and population, and 1969-2006 for the CPI. Output is state GDP, first deflated by the
national CPI and then by our state CPI measures. Employment is from the BLS payroll survey. The CPI measure is described in the
text. Standard errors are clustered by state or region.
TABLE II
The Effects of Military Spending 
Output Employment CPI
Prime Military Contracts 
Output          
defl. State CPIStates Regions States Regions States Regions States Regions
2.48 2.75 1.81 2.51 1.46 1.94 0.16 0.56
(0.94) (0.69) (0.41) (0.31) (0.58) (1.21) (0.14) (0.32)
4.79 2.60 2.07 1.97 1.79 1.74 0.19 0.64
(2.65) (1.18) (0.67) (0.98) (0.60) (1.00) (0.19) (0.31)
Num Obs. 1989 390 1989 390 1785 350 1989 390
States Regions States Regions States Regions States Regions
1.32 1.89 1.40 1.76 1.95 2.07 1.52 1.64
(0.36) (0.53) (0.34) (0.78) (0.62) (0.66) (0.37) (0.98)
1.43 1.72 1.52 1.38 2.21 1.90 1.62 1.28
(0.39) (0.66) (0.37) (1.05) (0.67) (1.02) (0.42) (1.16)
Num Obs. 1785 350 1938 380 1989 390 1836 360
Prime Military 
Contracts 
Prime Contracts plus 
Military Comp.
Output             
w/ Real Int. Contr.
Employment        
Level Instr.
The dependent variable is stated at top of each column. Each cell in the table reports results for a different regression with the main
regressor of interest listed in the far left column. Standard errors are in parentheses. Specifications: 1) and 2) Use national military
spending scaled by fraction of military spending in the state in 1966-1971 relative to the average fraction as the instrument for state
spending; 3) Constructs per-capita output using the working age population, which is available starting in 1970; 4) OLS estimates of
the benchmark specification; 5) Adds the price of oil interacted with state dummies as controls; 6) Adds the real interest rate
interacted with state dummies as controls; 7) LIML estimate of baseline specification; 8) Estimates the employment regression using
the BEA employment series, which starts in 1969. All specifications include time and regions fixed effects in addition to the main
regressor of interest.  Standard errors are clustered by state or region depending on the specification.   
TABLE III
Alternative Specifications for Effects of Military Spending
Output             
w/ Oil Controls
Output             
per Working Age
BEA               
Employment
Output             
OLS
Output             
LIML




Prime Contracts plus 
Military Comp.Weight States Regions
Construction 0.05 5.43* 5.51*
(1.24) (1.33)
Manufacturing 0.20 2.83* 3.45*
(0.95) (1.50)
Retail 0.09 1.36* 1.78*
(0.28) (0.51)
Services 0.18 0.99* 0.84*
(0.39) (0.41)
Wholesale 0.07 0.44 0.80
(0.35) (0.63)
Mining 0.02 -0.48 12.88
(3.03) (6.89)
Agriculture 0.02 1.85 0.72
(1.13) (3.81)
Transportation and Utilities 0.08 -0.05 0.03
(0.41) (0.67)
Finance, insurance, rental, estate 0.17 0.22 1.93
(0.71) (1.39)
Government 0.13 0.15 0.30
(0.34) (0.64)
    Federal Military 0.01 0.23 -1.37
(0.82) (1.87)
TABLE IV
Effect of Military Spending on Sectoral Output
The table reports results of regressions of the change in sectoral state output on the change in state
military spending. All regressions include region and time fixed effects, and are estimated by two
stage least squares. The sample period is 1966-2006. The first data column reports the weight of
each sector in total output over our sample period. All variables are in per capita terms. A star
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.States Regions States Regions
βh 3.54 3.27 1.85 2.20
(1.51) (1.60) (0.85) (1.53)
βl ‐ βh -2.80 -1.85 -0.75 -0.57
(1.49) (1.91) (0.89) (1.61)
Output Employment
Effects of Military Spending in High Versus Low Unemployment Periods
TABLE V
The dependent variable is stated at top of each column. Standard errors are in parentheses. The two
regressors are 1) change in military spending and 2) change in military spending interacted with a
dummy indicating whether the national unemployment rate is below its median value over the
sample period. This yields the effect of spending during high unemployment periods (βh) and the
difference between the effect of spending during low and high unemployment periods (βl - βh). All
regressions include region and time fixed effects, and are estimated by two stage least squares. The
sample period is 1966-2006. Output is state GDP. Employment is from the BLS payroll survey. All





Panel A: Sticky Prices
Volcker-Greenspan Monetary Policy 0.22 0.85
Constant Real Rate 1.00 0.85
Constant Nominal Rate -0.39 0.85
   Constant Nominal Rate (ρg=0.85) 1.70 0.90
Panel B: Flexible Prices
Constant Income Tax Rates 0.39 0.43
Balanced Budget 0.30 0.43
TABLE VI
Government Spending Multiplier in Separable Preferences Model
The table reports the government spending multiplier for output deflated by the regional CPI for the model
presented in the text with the separable preferences specification. Panel A presents results for the model with sticky
prices, while panel B presents results for the model with flexible prices. The first three rows differ only in the
monetary policy being assumed. The fourth row varies the persistence of the government spending shock relative




Panel A: Sticky Prices
Volcker-Greenspan Monetary Policy 0.15 1.48
Constant Real Rate 7.00 1.48
Constant Nominal Rate -0.64 1.48
   Constant Nominal Rate (ρg=0.50) 8.73 2.09
Panel B: Flexible Prices
Constant Income Tax Rates 0.00 0.30
Balanced Budget -0.25 0.30
TABLE VII
Government Spending Multiplier in GHH Model
The table reports the government spending multiplier for output deflated by the regional CPI for the model
presented in the text with the GHH preferences specification. Panel A presents results for the model with sticky
prices, while panel B presents results for the model with flexible prices. The first three rows differ only in the
monetary policy being assumed. The fourth row varies the persistence of the government spending shock relative
to the baseline parameter values. The fifth and sixth rows differ only in the tax policy being assumed.
Output Employment CPI Inflation
Fixed Capital 1.48 2.10 0.15
Var. Capital, Baseline 1.10 0.79 0.10
Var. Capital, High Labor Supply Elast. 1.47 1.44 0.02
Var. Capital, Flexible Prices 0.45 0.23 0.30
Open Economy Relative Multipliers for Output, Employment and Inflation
TABLE VIII
The table reports the open economy relative government spending multiplier for output, employment
and CPI inflation for the model with GHH preferences both excluding and including capital. Output is
deflated by the regional CPI. The first row presents results for the baseline specification of the GHH
model (same as in in table 5). The second row presents results for the baseline calibration of the model
with variable capital. The third row presents results for the model with variable capital and with a labor


































Figure II  


















































Quantiles of Change in Output Versus Predicted Change in Military Spending 
The figure shows averages of changes in output and predicted military spending (based on our first-stage 
regression), grouped by 30 quantiles of the predicted military spending variable.  Both variables are 
























Prices and Real Interest Rates after a Government Spending Shock 
The figure plots the relative price level and the relative real interest rate in the two regions for the model 






























Consumption and Real Interest Rate after a Government Spending Shock 
The figure plots the relative consumption and the relative real interest rate in the two regions for the 
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Output and Consumption after a Government Spending Shock in GHH Model 
The figure plots the relative output and consumption in the two regions for the model with GHH 
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